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Abstract
The post-1983 moderation coincided with an ahistorical divergence
in the money aggregate growth and velocity volatilities away from
the downward trending GDP and ination volatilities. Using an en-
dogenous growth monetary DSGE model, with micro-based banking
production, enables a contrasting characterization of the two great
volatility cycles over the historical period of 1919-2004, and enables
this puzzle to be addressed more easily. The volatility divergence is ex-
plained by the upswing in the credit volatility that kept money supply
variability from translating into ination and GDP volatility.
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1 Introduction
Explaining changes in real output and in ination has been done by focusing
on short run factors. For example the standard is to estimate the e¤ect of
current monetary policy shocks with the shock restricted to be only in the
short run. Yet studies continue to nd that trend ination is Granger caused
by money, such as in Crowder (1998) for the US, and Assenmacher-Wesche
and Gerlach (2008) for the Euro area in which the ination-money causality
is found for the medium and longer run. Econometric studies nd a long
run negative e¤ect of ination on growth, such as Fountas, Karanasos, and
Kim (2006), who nd this for the US, UK and Japan with Granger causality
from ination to growth. This suggests that money shocks may well have
persistence that a¤ects real variables over long periods of time. And as Muller
and Watson (2008) conclude:
Most macroeconomic series and relationships thus exhibit pro-
nounced non-trivial dynamics below business-cycle frequencies...this
underlies the importance of understanding the sources and impli-
cations of such low frequency volatility changes (p.1008).
Ignoring the long run impact of monetary policy also excludes a reputable
ination tax literature that starts with Bailey, 1956, and goes up to the
ination-induced goods to leisure substitution that decreases the endogenous
output growth rate (Gomme 1993, Gillman and Kejak 2005). Benk et al.
(2008) apply these Lucas (1988) -based growth extensions to Cooley and
Hansen (1989) so as to include key likely shocks that a¤ect the uctuations
of velocity: goods productivity, money supply, and credit shocks as in Benk,
Gillman, and Kejak (2005).
This paper includes long run features of the data and applies the Benk et
al. (2008) framework to explain a puzzle: why the annual US volatility of in-
ation and output diverged downwards after 1983 away from the volatilities
of velocity and money supply growth which moved upwards post-1983, after
all four of these volatilities had moved together historically from 1919-1983
(Section 2). Rather than ltering out long run features of the shocks on the
basis that they are unimportant to volatility, a minimal 86 year Christiano
and Fitzgerald (2003) lter is used to obtain stationarity series, with win-
dows for the short run, business cycle and long run as dened in Levy and
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Dezhbakhsh (2003), at 0-2 years, 3-8 years, and 8+ years respectively; the
latter window is similar to the long run of Muller and Watson (2008).
Money shocks are found to have a signicant e¤ect on the volatility of
endogenous growth rate of output and of ination, as are the credit and
goods productivity shocks, across the full frequency spectrum (Section 5).
As in Ingram, Kocherlakota, and Savin (1994) and Benk et al. (2008), the
parsimonious set of shocks are constructed from the equilibrium solution of
the economy and from actual ltered data on equilibrium variables, including
the state variable. These shocks are found to explain, on average across
the four subperiods covering 1919-2004, about 50% of the output growth
variability and 72% of the ination variability, and with variation taking
place in all three frequencies.
The explanation of the puzzle is that the models implied credit shock
volatility rose at the same time as velocity and money supply volatilities,
suggesting that a greater volatility of credit during the nancially deregu-
lated period insulated the economy from ination and GDP volatility. As
a corollary, in contrast during the Depression period when credit was con-
strained by virtue of the bank failures, ination and velocity variability were
much higher than credit variability and monetary shocks could more easily
translate into ination and GDP shocks.
The puzzles explanation is supported by simulation results that show a
good ability of the model in explaining RBC and monetary relative volatil-
ities and correlations, as compared to the data over the period (Section 4).
Also supportive is that the models credit shock correlation with the goods
productivity shock changes from an historically negative sign, during the sub-
periods occurring from 1919-1983, to a positive sign during the Great Mod-
eration subperiod of 1984-2004. And the standard deviation of the money
shock is found to vary little across the four subperiods of the two cycles,
indicating that indeed the money supply shock process can be viewed histor-
ically as part of a continuous monetary policy process in which shocks arise
as part of a stable variance structure (Section 6).
The nancial deregulation approach to the puzzle is not inconsistent with
role of nance contributing to the Great Moderation as in Jermann and
Quadrini (2006) or Perri and Quadrini (2008). And the long run contribution
of the money shock to volatility is consistent with what Chari, Kehoe, and
McGrattan (2008) argue needs to be a part of the monetary policy process
in order to explain interest rate empirics. Ignoring this component, as well
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as ignoring the distortions along the labor-leisure margin, they argue result
in a "dubiously" specied set of shocks with non-robust policy prognoses. In
our economy, with the money supply as part of the shocks of the economy,
and with credit productivity shocks associated with changes in banking laws,
these shocks can a¤ect the long run ination rate, nominal interest rate and
the leisure-labor margin as well as provide potentially a policy-related way in
which important volatilities can rise and fall. Fluctuations in money-induced
ination taxes and in implicit taxes from banking regulation can a¤ect the
economys margins.
2 Historical Trends
Viewing the historical volatility cycles reveals a volatility puzzle. US GDP
and ination rate volatilities rose steadily from the 1950s through the mid-
1980s, and then subsequently decreased during the "Great Moderation",
thereby creating a full volatility cycle. Preceding this volatility cycle was a
larger rise and decline in these two volatilities in the period from 1919-1954,
encompassing the Great Depression and WWII. Figures 1-4 show that ina-
tion, its volatility, the money supply growth rate, money velocity volatility
and GDP volatility all moved roughly together from 1919-1983. Post-1983,
ination and GDP volatility moved downwards together while money supply
growth and velocity volatility diverged upwards.1
1) The absolute value of the ination rate level and its volatility move
together, as can be seen in Figure 1. That ination is positively related to
ination uncertainty is supported in Fountas and Karanasos (2007) for the
G7 countries.
2) The M1 money supply growth rate tracts ination, as seen in Figure 2,
although with prominent deviations post 1983. Here a 5-year moving average
is used for money growth so as to focus on the trend.
3) Ination volatility, GDP volatility, and GDP growth rate volatility
moved together closely (except WWII); see Figure 3. There was a volatility
cycle after WWI, that went up and down from the 1920s to the 1950s (with
a double hump for GDP including WWII); there is another lower magnitude
1Volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of the variable over a certain window.
For annual data it is a 7 year window; the formula is
volatility(xt) = SD(xt k; xt k+1; :::xt; :::; xt+k 1;xt+k); where k = 3.
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Figure 1: Absolute Value of Ination and its Volatility, 1919-2004
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
19
19
19
23
19
27
19
31
19
35
19
39
19
43
19
47
19
51
19
55
19
59
19
63
19
67
19
71
19
75
19
79
19
83
19
87
19
91
19
95
19
99
20
03
grM1 Inflation
Figure 2: M1 Money Supply Growth (5-Yr MA) and Ination, 1919-2004
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cycle, up and down, from the 1950s to 2000.2
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Figure 3: Volatilites of Ination, GDP, and GDP Growth, 1919-2004
4) Lessor known, money velocity volatility and M1 growth rate volatility
moved together and broadly followed ination and GDP volatility up until
1983, when they together sharply diverged from the other two.
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Figure 4: Volatilities of GDP, Ination, Velocity and M1 Growth 1919-2004
Together these facts suggest as historically plausible a priori the proposi-
tion that the money supply growth may partly cause ination and its volatil-
ity, which is correlated with GDP volatility, while allowing for the possibility
2Ination volatility in Figures 3 and 4 is scaled by multiplying it by the average propor-
tion di¤erence between it and the GDP volatility for the 1919-2004 period. Standard data
is used for GDP (described in Appendix A.1); alternative experimentation with the Miron
and Romer (1990) data found a larger volatility of GDP during the 1919-1939 period.
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that the puzzling divergent increase in the volatility of money supply growth
and money velocity post-1983 could be entangled with new credit instruments
that enabled facile ination avoidance after nancial deregulation.
3 Stochastic Endogenous Growth with Bank-
ing
The representative agent economy is extended from Benk, Gillman, and Ke-
jak (2008) by decentralizing the bank sector that produces credit. By com-
bining the business cycle with endogenous growth, stationary ination lowers
the output growth rate as supported empirically for example in Gillman, Har-
ris, and Matyas (2004) and Fountas, Karanasos, and Kim (2006). Over the
business cycle, shocks cause changes in growth rates and in stationary ratios.
The shocks to the goods sector productivity and the money supply growth
rate are standard, while the third shock to the credit sector productivity ex-
ists by virtue of the models endogeneity of money velocity via a micro-based
production of exchange credit.
The shocks occur at the beginning of the period, observed by the con-
sumer before the decision process, and follow a vector rst-order autoregres-
sive process. For goods sector productivity, zt; the money supply growth
rate, ut; and bank sector productivity, vt :
Zt = ZZt 1 + "Zt; (1)
where the shocks are Zt = [zt ut vt]
0, the autocorrelation matrix is Z =
diag f'z; 'u; 'vg and 'z; 'u; 'v 2 (0; 1) are autocorrelation parameters, and
the shock innovations are "Zt = [zt ut vt]
0 N (0;) : The general struc-
ture of the second-order moments is assumed to be given by the variance-
covariance matrix . These shocks a¤ect the economy as described below.
3.1 Consumer Problem
A representative consumer has expected lifetime utility from consumption of
goods, ct; and leisure, xt; with  2 (0; 1) and  > 0; this is given by
U = E0
1X
t=0

(ctx
	
t )
1 
1   : (2)
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Output of goods, yt, and increases in human capital, are produced with
physical capital and e¤ective labor each in Cobb-Douglas fashion; the bank
sector produces exchange credit using labor and deposits as inputs. Let sGt
and sHt denote the fractions of physical capital that the agent uses in the
goods production (G) and human capital investment (H), whereby
sGt + sHt = 1: (3)
The agent allocates a time endowment of one amongst leisure, xt; labor
in goods production, lt, time spent investing in the stock of human capital,
nt, and time spent working in the bank sector, denoted by ft:
lt + nt + ft + xt = 1: (4)
Output of goods can be converted into physical capital, kt; without cost
and so is divided between consumption goods and investment, denoted by it;
net of capital depreciation. Thus, the capital stock used for production in
the next period is given by:
kt+1 = (1  k)kt + it = (1  k)kt + yt   ct: (5)
The human capital investment is produced using capital sHtkt and e¤ective
labor ntht (King and Rebelo 1990):
H(sHtkt; ntht) = AH(sHtkt)
1 (ntht): (6)
And the human capital ow constraint is:
ht+1 = (1  h)ht +H(sHtkt; ntht): (7)
With wt and rt denoting the real wage and real interest rate, the consumer
receives nominal income of wages and rents, Ptwt (lt + ft)ht and Ptrt (sGt + sQt) kt;
a nominal transfer from the government, Tt; and dividends from the bank.
The consumer buys shares in the bank by making deposits of income
at the bank. Each dollar deposited buys one share at a xed price of one,
and the consumer receives the residual prot of the bank as dividend income
in proportion to the number of shares (deposits) owned. Denoting the real
quantity of deposits by dt; and the dividend per unit of deposits as RQt; the
consumer receives a nominal dividend income of PtRQtdt: The consumer also
pays to the bank a fee for credit services, whereby one unit of credit service
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is required for each unit of credit that the bank supplies the consumer for use
in buying goods. With PQt denoting the nominal price of each unit of credit,
and qt the real quantity of credit that the consumer can use in exchange, the
consumer pays PQtqt in credit fees.
With other expenditures on goods, of Ptct; and physical capital invest-
ment, Ptkt+1   Pt(1   k)kt; and on investment in cash for purchases, of
Mt+1  Mt; the consumers budget constraint is
Ptwt (lt + ft)ht + PtrtsGtkt + PtRQtdt + Tt (8)
 PQtqt + Ptct + Ptkt+1   Pt(1  k)kt +Mt+1  Mt:
The consumer can purchase the goods by using either moneyMt or credit
services. With the lump sum transfer of cash Tt coming from the government
at the beginning of the period, and with money and credit equally usable to
buys goods, the consumers exchange technology is
Mt + Tt + Ptqt  Ptct: (9)
Since all cash comes out of deposits at the bank, and credit purchases are
paid o¤ at the end of the period out of the same deposits, the total deposits
are equal to consumption. This gives the constraint that
dt = ct: (10)
Given k0, h0; and the evolution of Mt (t  0) as given by the exogenous
monetary policy in equation (18) below, the consumer maximizes utility sub-
ject to the budget,exchange and deposit constraints (8)-(10).
3.2 Banking Firm Problem
The bank produces credit that is available for exchange at the point of pur-
chase. The bank determines the amount of such credit by maximizing its div-
idend prot subject to the labor and deposit costs of producing the credit.
The production of credit uses a constant returns to scale technology with
e¤ective labor and deposited funds as inputs. This follows the "nancial
intermediation approach" (Matthews and Thompson 2008) that is dominant
in the banking literature, which was started by Clark (1984) and Hancock
(1985). In particular, with AF > 0 and  2 (0; 1);
8
qt = AF e
vt (ftht)
 d1 t ; (11)
where AF evt is the stochastic factor productivity. 3
Subject to the production function in equation (11), the bank maximizes
prot Qt with respect to the labor ft and deposits dt:
Qt = PQtqt   Ptwtftht   PtRQtdt: (12)
Equilibrium implies that
PQt
Pt

AF e
vt

ftht
dt
 1
= wt; (13)
PQt
Pt

(1  )AF evt

ftht
dt

= RQt: (14)
These indicate that the marginal cost of credit,

PQt
Pt

, is equal to the mar-
ginal factor price divided by the marginal factor product, or wt
AF evt

ftht
dt
 1 ;
and that the zero prot dividend yield paid on deposits is equal to the fraction
of the marginal cost given by

PQt
Pt

(1  )

qt
dt

:
3.3 Goods Producer Problem
The rm maximizes prot given by yt wtltht rtsGtkt; subject to a standard
Cobb-Douglas production function in e¤ective labor and capital:
yt = AGe
zt(sGtkt)
1 (ltht): (15)
The rst order conditions for the rms problem yield the following expres-
sions for the wage rate and the rental rate of capital:
wt = AGe
zt

sGtkt
ltht
1 
; (16)
3This "banking time" model can be interpreted as a special case of the shopping time
model: substituting qt from equation (11) into equation (9), and for dt from equation (10),
and solving for the e¤ective banking time as ftht =

ct mt
AF evtc
1 
t
1=
; with (Mt + Tt) =Pt 
mt; then ftht = g(mt; ct); with g1 < 0 and g2 > 0; as in a shopping time model. However
there is no Feenstra (1986) equivalence to a standard money-in-the-utility function model
because then ht would enter the utility function, as seen by solving for the raw bank time
ft = g^ (mt; ct)ht; substituting for ft in the allocation of time constraint (4), solving for xt
from this time constraint and substituting into the utility function.
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rt = (1  )AGezt

sGtkt
ltht
 
: (17)
3.4 Government Money Supply
It is assumed that the government policy includes sequences of nominal trans-
fers which satisfy:
Tt = tMt = (
 + eut   1)Mt; t = [Mt  Mt 1]=Mt 1: (18)
where t is the growth rate of money and  is the stationary gross growth
rate of money.
3.5 Denition of Competitive Equilibrium
The representative agents optimization problem can be written recursively
as:
V (s) = max
c;x;l;n;f;sG;q;d;k0;h0;M 0

(ctx
	
t )
1 
1   + EV (s
0)

(19)
subject to the conditions (3) to (10), where the state of the economy is
denoted by s = (k; h;M; z; u; v) and a prime () indicates the next-period
values. A competitive equilibrium consists of a set of policy functions c(s),
x(s), l(s), n(s), f(s), sG(s), sH (s) ; q(s), d(s), k0(s), h0(s), M 0(s), pricing
functions P (s), w(s), r(s); RQ(s); PQ(s) and a value function V (s), such
that:
(i) the consumer maximize utility, given the pricing functions and the
policy functions, so that V (s) solves the functional equation (19);
(ii) the bank rm maximizes prot similarly in equation (12) subject to
the technology of equation (11)
(iii) the goods producer maximizes prot similarly, with the resulting
functions for w and r being given by equations (16) and (17);
(iv) the goods, money and credit markets clear, in equations (11), (15)
and (18).
3.6 Balanced-Growth Path Equilibrium
As derived from the equilibrium above, a partial set of equilibrium condi-
tions along the balanced-growth path (BGP) are given here to describe the
10
deterministic balanced-growth path equilibrium, and how ination a¤ects it.
The balanced-growth rate is denoted by g; and dropping time subscripts on
stationary variables the BGP conditions are
PQt
Pt

= R; (20)
1 +R = (1 + ) (1 + r   k) ; (21)
x
ct
=
1 + ~R
wht
; (22)
~R =

1  qt
dt

R +

qt
dt

R; (23)
qt
dt
= 1  (AF evt)
1
1 

R
w
 
1 
; (24)
rH  "AH

sHkt
lHht
(1 ")
(1  x); (25)
(1 + g) =
1 + rH   H
1 + 
=
1 + r   K
1 + 
: (26)
The relative price of credit is its marginal cost and by equation (20) this
is equal to the nominal interest rate. At the optimum, the nominal interest R
of equation (21) equals zero and no credit is used. But as ination rises, the
agent substitutes from goods towards leisure while equalizing the margin of
the ratio of the shadow price of goods to leisure, x=(ct) =
h
1 + ~R
i
= (wht) ;
in equation (22). Here ~R; as given in equation (23), is the average exchange
cost per unit of output; this equals the average cost of using cash, R; weighted
by 1  qt
dt
and the average cost of using credit, R; weighted by qt
dt
: That Rt is
an average cost can be veried by dividing the total cost of credit production
by the total output of credit production. And this total exchange cost deter-
mines how much substitution there is from money to credit, and from goods
to leisure. The solution for consumption-normalized money demand, 1  qt
ct
;
is derived from equation (9), (10) and (24); from here it is clear that the
consumption velocity of money, denoted by vt  ctMt
Pt
; rises at an increasing
rate as the nominal interest rate rises (see Gillman and Kejak, 2005).
Ination-induced substitution towards leisure causes a fall in the human
capital return of rH  "AH(sHkt=lHh)(1 ")(1   x) , given in equation (25).
The marginal product of physical capital r, in equation (17), also falls, while
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the real wage w in equation (16) rises. This causes a Tobin (1965)-type
substitution from labor to capital across both goods and human capital in-
vestment sectors in response to the higher real wage to real interest rate
ratio; the Tobin (1965) like rise in sHkt=lHht mitigates but does not reverse
the fall in the return to human capital rH caused by the increase in leisure.
The growth rate, in equation (26), falls as R rises since both rH and r fall.
But as the ination rate continues to rise, the credit substitution channel
allows the growth rate to decline at a decreasing rate, as increasingly more
credit and less leisure are used as the substitute for the ination-taxed good
(Gillman and Kejak 2005).
4 Model Simulation
4.1 Calibration
Table 1 presents the parameters for the calibration which are chosen in order
to match the Table 2 target values of certain variables; the targets are the
average annual values from US time series for 1919-2004. These values reect
issues raised by Gomme and Rupert (2007), in their study of the two sector
real business cycle model, in that our human capital sector is a second sector
with some comparison to the household sector in Gomme and Rupert.
The capital share in the goods sector is set at 1    = 0:36 as in Jones,
Manuelli, and Siu (2005), the annual discount factor is set at  = 0:96, and
log-utility is assumed so that  = 1: The US average annual output growth
rate g is set at 2:4% as in the data. The baseline investment to output ratio
target value is i=y = 0:26: For comparison this is 0:13 in Gomme and Ruppert
for postwar market structures, equipment and software. But also including
consumer durables in Gomme and Ruppert adds 0:10; and housing adds
another 0:056; for a postwar total of 0:29. Our education sector will include
some of this investment, causing a rate less than 0:29: However, there are
alternative ways to measure i=y as discussed in Gomme and Ruppert. The
0:26 value implies that the annual depreciation rate of capital is K = 0:031.
In turn this gives the goods sector capital to e¤ective labor ratio and the real
interest rate net of depreciation of r   K = 0:067:
The rate of depreciation of human capital is set at H = 0:025 as in Jones
et al. (2005) and Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1989). The allocation of time is
similar to Gomme and Rupert (2007), with the working time set at l = 0:24
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and leisure at x = 0:55. Time in human capital investment is set at n = 0:2.
Given n; g; and H and equation (7) implies the capital to e¤ective labor
ratio in the human capital sector and so the value of the capital share in the
education sector, which is " = 0:83. The chosen values imply AH = 0:21;
with the weight on the leisure in the utility function given by  = 1:84:
In the banking sector we set the value of the inverse of the consumption
velocity of money, m=c, equal to the average annual value for the period
1919-2004, which is 0.38. The average annual ination rate, , over the
same period is 2.6% which implies that the annual money growth, , is equal
to 5%. Using an approximate cost of an exchange credit card (American
Express) at $100, and the per capita annual consumption expenditure, c =
$15780, both at 2006 prices, the share of the labor in the banking sector is
 = 100=[R(1   [m=c])c] = 0:11 (for further details see the calibration in
Benk et al., 2008).
Table 1 also includes the parameters characterizing the shock processes of
equation (1); these are chosen through an iterative process by which the as-
sumed shock parameters converge with the actual shock parameters that are
in turn estimated from the constructed shock processes described in Appen-
dix A3. In particular, estimated parameters are inputed back into the model,
shocks are re-constructed and parameters re-estimated until convergence is
achieved in the parameter structure.
4.2 E¤ects of Shocks on Output Growth and Ination
In order to solve the model, we log-linearize the equilibrium conditions of the
model around its deterministic steady state, with variables that grow along
the balanced-path normalized to stationary variables by dividing them by
the human capital stock ht: The impulse responses of the shocks are given
in the Appendix in Figures 13-18. The initial impact of the shocks in the
rst period involves no change in the capital stocks, so that starting from
the BGP equilibrium the changes in levels go in the same direction as the
changes in growth rates. And the percentage changes of non-state variables
like consumption are equal to the changes of the related normalized values.
Indicating the percentage deviation from the balanced growth path byb, then
for example this means that bct = d(ct=ht):
A positive money growth shock, ut > 0, causes the ination rate and
nominal interest rate to deviate upwards; bt > 0; cRt > 0: Consumption
13
Preferences
 1 Relative risk aversion parameter
 1.84 Leisure weight
 0.96 Discount factor
Goods Production
 0.64 Labor share in goods production
K 0.031 Depreciation rate of goods sector
AG 1 Goods productivity parameter
Human Capital Production
" 0.83 Labor share in human capital production
H 0.025 Depreciation rate of human capital sector
AH 0.21 Human capital productivity parameter
Banking Sector
 0.11 Labor share in credit production
AF 1.1 Banking productivity parameter
Government
 0.05 Money growth rate
Shocks processes
Autocorrelation parameters
'z 0.84 Production productivity
'u 0.74 Money growth rate
'v 0.73 Banking productivity
Variances
z 0.77 Production productivity
u 0.50 Money growth rate
v 1.16 Banking productivity
Table 1: Parameters of Calibration
g 0.024 Avg. annual output growth rate
 0.026 Avg. annual ination rate
l 0.248 Labor used in goods sector
n 0.20 Labor used in human capital sector
f 0.0018 Labor used in banking sector
i=y 0.26 Investment-output ratio in goods sector
m=c 0.38 Share of money transactions
Table 2: Target Values of Calibration
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declines on impact of the shock, so that bct < 0; because of the increased
shadow price c~Rt > 0: Investment drops some; bit < 0: And so output drops
as both consumption and investment decrease; byt < 0: Thus the growth rate
of output declines from a money shock. Another perspective of the output
decrease is that the return to physical capital falls: by log-linearizing (17),brt    csGt   blt + d(kt=ht) ; or since the capital stock is constant at impact,brt    csGt   blt : It results that brt < 0; so that blt > jcsGtj : Since the share
of labor and capital in goods production both decrease it follows that byt 
(1  ) csGt + blt < 0: So output also falls by that route. The related e¤ect
on the output of human capital and its return is revealed from the change
in the real wage: by log-linearizing (16), bwt  (1  )csGt   blt > 0: This
implies that the shares in human capital output go up, so that csHt > 0 andclHt > 0 and output in human capital increases as does its output growth rate:cgHt > 0: And because bwt  c~Rt  ~R=1 + ~R < 0; the consumption shadow
price increases relative to the leisure shadow price, inducing substitution from
consumption towards leisure, so that bxt > 0: This leisure increase causes a
lower return to human capital (see equation 25) and a consequent lower
growth rate of consumption, denoted by cgct < 0:
A positive credit shock, vt > 0; on the contrary leads to a decreased cost
of exchange, and works in reverse as compared to a monetary shock. A goods
productivity shock, zt > 0; directly increases the interest rate, brt > 0; and
the wage rate, bwt > 0: Since the return to physical capital is larger than the
return to human capital, resources move into the goods sector so that csGt > 0;blt > 0 and byt > 0: Increased consumption and real money demand cause a
decrease in the ination rate; bt < 0. So a positive goods productivity shock
causes an increase in output growth and a decrease in the ination rate.
The e¤ect of shocks on ination can also be seen from by log-linearizing
equations (9) and (18): bt = cgV t  cgct + ut (27)
where ut is monetary supply growth rate shock and gV t is the growth rate of
consumption velocity Vt dened as Vt = Ptct=Mt+1. A positive money shock
directly causes ination to deviate upwards; bt > 0: And since this shock
causes velocity to rise and consumption growth to fall (cgV t > 0 and cgct < 0);
these other factors both go in the same direction so as to further amplify
the ination rate increase. If the shock e¤ects on cgct and cgV t are small,
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then bt ' ut: However, the other shocks can be important, such as the shift
up on velocity when credit was deregulated in the early 1980s; this would
have raised ination sharply above the level of the money supply growth
rate, which is broadly consistent with the "missing money" at that time.
A positive credit shock causes both velocity and consumption growth to rise
(cgV t > 0 andcgct > 0), resulting in opposing e¤ects. A positive shock to goods
productivity causes consumption velocity to be somewhat a¤ected (see Benk
et al., 2008) while making cgct > 0 so that ination decreases; bt < 0:
4.3 Simulation Results
Table 3 presents US data stylized facts and simulations of the model, in
terms of moments of a set of variables for the period 1919-2004; Tables 4
and 5 present the same for the 1919-1954 and 1955-2004 subperiods. The
data series have been detrended using the Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003)
asymmetric frequency lter with a band of 2-86 years (where 86 is the sample
size). And the covariance matrix is separately computed for each of the two
subperiods and for the whole period.
Results are divided into the real side, or RBC, and the more monetary
side, or Monetary. On the real side, consumption, investment and output
growth volatilities relative to output volatility, along with output and output
growth correlations are simulated rather well in the full sample and both
subsamples. However, simulated investment has an output correlation above
the data in 1919-1954; simulated consumption volatility is low relative to
data in the second volatility cycle of 1955-2004; and simulated consumption
correlation with output growth is too high. Employment, dened as labor
hours in the goods and banking sector or lt + ft; has a simulated relative
volatility that is right on the data.
Monetary results show that simulated velocity volatilities are close to
data; and there is at most a 0.17 di¤erence between simulated velocity cor-
relation with output and output growth in the three samples. The simulated
real money (normalized by human capital) gets the relative volatility very
close to the data, with output and output growth rate correlations close in
the full sample but less close in the 1955-2004 period.
While the ination correlation with output is not well captured, in con-
trast the correct signs of the ination correlation with output growth are well
captured. And even though the sign of the ination correlation with output
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Simulation Results RELATIVE OUTPUT OUTPUT GROWTH RATE
Data: 1919-2004 VOLATILITY CORRELATION CORRELATION
Simulated Data Simulated Data Simulated Data
RBC
Consumption 0.51 0.64 0.71 0.56 0.30 0.01
Investment 2.97 4.09 0.94 0.53 0.31 0.17
Output Growth Rate 0.29 0.48 0.35 0.20 1.00 1.00
Employment 0.73 0.75 0.84 0.91 0.26 0.30
Monetary
Income Velocity of Money 1.21 1.39 -0.03 0.06 -0.05 0.01
Normalized Real Money 1.60 1.61 0.65 0.47 0.26 0.14
Ination Rate 0.81 0.44 -0.44 0.40 0.10 0.32
Note: See Appendix for data sources. All data series represent the cyclical component of the data
ltered with the Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) asymmetric frequency lter with a band of 2-86 years
(86=sample size). Series are in logs except those that represent rates. Relative volatility is measured as
the ratio of standard deviation of the series to the standard deviation of GDP
Table 3: US Business Cycle Facts, 1919-2004, and Simulations
growth changes across prewar and postwar subperiods, the model captures
this. And this can be seen as support for the models central feature of
the ination tax e¤ect on output growth. Figure 5 shows the ination rate
and the GDP growth rate over the whole sample: both the positive correla-
tion between these variables in the rst half of the sample, before 1955, and
the negative correlation between these variables apparent in after 1955, is
captured in the 1919-1954 and the 1955-2004 simulation results.
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Figure 5: GDP Growth Rate and the Ination Rate, 1919-2004
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Simulation Results RELATIVE OUTPUT OUTPUT GROWTH RATE
Data: 1919-1954 VOLATILITY CORRELATION CORRELATION
Simulated Data Simulated Data Simulated Data
RBC
Consumption 0.47 0.61 0.66 0.52 0.29 0.01
Investment 3.11 4.05 0.95 0.49 0.22 0.19
Output Growth Rate 0.32 0.48 0.28 0.23 1.00 1.00
Employment 0.76 0.75 0.87 0.95 0.17 0.33
Monetary
Income Velocity of Money 0.96 1.22 0.10 -0.03 -0.07 0.05
Normalized Real Money 1.32 1.54 0.69 0.57 0.27 0.13
Ination Rate 0.73 0.42 -0.48 0.38 0.16 0.45
Note: See Appendix for data sources. All data series represent the cyclical component of the data
ltered with the Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) asymmetric frequency lter with a band of 2-86 years
(86=sample size). Series are in logs except those that represent rates. Relative volatility is measured as
the ratio of standard deviation of the series to the standard deviation of GDP
Table 4: US Business Cycle Facts, 1919-1954, and Simulations
Simulation Results RELATIVE OUTPUT OUTPUT GROWTH RATE
Data: 1955-2004 VOLATILITY CORRELATION CORRELATION
Simulated Data Simulated Data Simulated Data
RBC
Consumption 0.49 0.94 0.70 0.85 0.30 0.03
Investment 3.01 3.87 0.95 0.86 0.22 0.14
Output Growth Rate 0.31 0.59 0.28 0.04 1.00 1.00
Employment 0.76 0.72 0.86 0.41 0.18 0.06
Monetary
Income Velocity of Money 2.86 2.55 0.24 0.40 0.05 -0.12
Normalized Real Money 2.79 2.28 0.11 -0.03 0.06 0.17
Ination Rate 1.31 0.59 -0.01 0.39 -0.08 -0.50
Note: See Appendix for data sources. All data series represent the cyclical component of the data
ltered with the Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) asymmetric frequency lter with a band of 2-86 years
(86=sample size). Series are in logs except those that represent rates. Relative volatility is measured as
the ratio of standard deviation of the series to the standard deviation of GDP
Table 5: US Business Cycle Facts, 1955-2004, and Simulations
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5 Shocks and Volatilities
The money shocks, ut; and the productivity shocks in credit and goods pro-
duction, vt and zt; are recovered by a least squares procedure using the equi-
librium solution of the model and data series for six of the unknown variables
of the model. This process is described in Appendix A.1, as in Benk et al.
(2005, 2008). The actual constructed shocks both under endogenous and ex-
ogenous growth are found below. One di¤erence from previous work is that
we use a band pass lter that takes out only the 86 year trend from the data,
a minimalist lter desirable for leaving in the longer run features, along with
business cycle and short run features (see Section 5.1 for the lter).
5.1 Band Pass Filters
Figure 6 shows the band pass lters of the three shocks at the di¤erent fre-
quencies across the whole sample period. A result is that the short run
uctuations of all three shocks (the righthand panels) are much more appar-
ent in the rst volatility cycle period than in the second. Fluctuations at the
business cycle frequency (middle panels) are larger during the depression and
WWII. The long run uctuations (lefthand panels) are more severe for the
productivity shock during the rst volatility cycle period, but rather equal
across both cycle periods for the money shock. This last result is apparently
due to the large ination build-up during the 1960s and 1970s that rivaled
the deation of the depression in terms of the amplitude of the uctuation.
In sum, all three frequencies indicate non-trivial and plausible aspects of the
shocks.
5.2 Variance Decompositions
A variance decomposition of output growth and ination is presented for both
endogenous and exogenous growth versions of the model.4 Tables 6 and 7
show how much of the total variance in the data is explained within each sub-
period by each of the models shocks: the productivity (PR), money (M) and
credit (CR) shocks. Variance is further decomposed by frequencies, across
the various subperiods. The short-run (SR) frequency band corresponds to
cycles of 2-3 years, the business cycle (BC) frequency band to cycles of 3-8
4The parameters for the exogenous growth model are the same as for the endogenous
growth model parameters of Table 1, except for the lack of human capital parameters.
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Figure 6: The decomposition of money (u), credit (v) and productivity (z)
shocks into their long run (LR), business cycle (BC) and short run (SR)
components
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years, and the long-run (LR) band to cycles of 8 years and longer; the spec-
tral density of the series is normalized by the series variance, and then its
integral is computed over the corresponding frequency band. This gives a 9
element, three-by-three, submatrix within the two tables for each subperiod.
The fourth and eighth columns are marked FREQ and these show the total
variance found within each frequency by the respective endogenous and ex-
ogenous growth models; the sum of the columns in contrast is the amount of
variation within each frequency of the data that is explained by the model.
The results are reported for the entire 1919-2004 period, and for 1919-
1935, 1936-1954, 1955-1982, and 1983-2004, corresponding approximately to
the rise and fall of the two volatility cycles. Note that in Figure 4, ina-
tion volatility peaks in the rst volatility cycle around 1935, but the GDP
volatility continues to have another double peak during WWII and only then
recedes. So this 1935 date is based more on the ination peak and other
dates could be used. For the second volatility cycle, Figure 4 shows that
GDP volatility troughs in 1954 (when the Korean War was over, with an
armistice signed on July 27, 1953), but GDP growth and ination troughed
in 1963 (on August 7, 1964 the US approved the use of military force in
the Vietnam War, without declaring war, through the Gulf of Tonkin Res-
olution); so the 1954 dividing point might alternatively be substituted by
1963.
For GDP growth volatility, Table 6 shows that consistently more than
double the total simulated variation takes place in the long run than in the
SR and BC frequencies, for the endogenous growth versus the exogenous
growth models, as seen by comparing the FREQ columns. But how do the
models perform in terms of explaining the datas volatility? For the entire
period of 1919-2004, the last three rows show that the endogenous growth
model explains only a total of 22% (the sum of the 9 three-by-three elements)
of the total variation versus 46% for exogenous growth. But looking at the
subperiods gives a di¤erent story. Overall, the endogenous growth model
explains 65% of the Great Depression subperiod, 44%, 47% and 49% for
the other subperiods, versus 64%, 48%, 59% and 26% for the exogenous
growth model. Even though the average subperiod explained volatility is
comparable at 51% for the endogenous growth and 49% for the exogenous
growth models, the Great Moderation subperiod is the standout di¤erence,
with the endogenous growth model explaining almost double the volatility.
More particularly, productivity shocks explain between 7 and 21% of the
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Endogenous Exogenous
PR M CR FREQ PR M CR FREQ
1919-1935
SR 7% 7% 7% 25% 13% 11% 3% 37%
BC 9% 4% 5% 38% 16% 1% 7% 45%
LR 2% 18% 6% 37% 3% 3% 7% 18%
1936-1954
SR 0% 7% 7% 28% 1% 15% 16% 38%
BC 3% 6% 6% 41% 4% 18% 2% 48%
LR 4% 7% 4% 31% 2% 0% 0% 14%
1955-1982
SR 8% 2% 2% 18% 18% 4% 2% 36%
BC 12% 1% 1% 33% 19% 1% 12% 44%
LR 1% 11% 9% 49% 1% 0% 2% 20%
1983-2004
SR 3% 3% 3% 15% 7% 0% 0% 35%
BC 4% 10% 11% 30% 9% 0% 0% 44%
LR 5% 5% 5% 55% 1% 8% 1% 21%
1919-2004
SR 2% 4% 4% 19% 6% 14% 4% 34%
BC 5% 2% 3% 34% 8% 7% 4% 46%
LR 0% 1% 1% 47% 0% 0% 3% 20%
Table 6: Decomposition of Variance of GDP growth by Frequency, 1919-2004
variation across the four subperiods, with more explained during the volatil-
ity upswings than the downswings. The average for productivity shocks is
16% of the variation each subperiod, with the average for money and credit
shocks being 20% and 16%. Money shocks explain 29% of the variation
during the Great Depression subperiod, with much of this in the LR spec-
trum. However credit shocks explain relatively the most during the Great
Moderation subperiod (19% of the variation).
For ination, Table 7 shows the endogenous growth and exogenous growth
give many similar results, with an across-subperiod average of 72% of the
datas variation explained in endogenous growth and 80% in exogenous growth,
and with a substantial amount of this in the LR spectrum. The total ex-
plained variation by subperiod is 98%, 88%, 54% and 50% of the volatility
for endogenous growth, and 87%, 90%, 58% and 84% for exogenous growth;
in the entire period sample this is 70% versus 61% for endogenous and ex-
ogenous growth. The average explained variance by shock in the endogenous
growth model, for PR, M and CR, is 19%, 25% and 27% and in exogenous
growth, 20%, 32% and 16%. With endogenous growth, money and credit
shocks explain most of the ination variation during the Great Depression
subperiod, while in the Great Moderation the goods productivity PR shock
explains the most total variation, with a equal split in the total contribution
of the M and CR shocks.
The e¤ects of the shocks on output and ination can also be graphi-
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Endogenous Exogenous
PR M CR FREQ PR M CR FREQ
1919-1935
SR 1% 16% 21% 37% 2% 22% 9% 36%
BC 4% 15% 23% 45% 7% 26% 1% 45%
LR 5% 11% 3% 18% 9% 1% 10% 19%
1936-1954
SR 4% 14% 15% 33% 5% 21% 4% 33%
BC 18% 4% 5% 43% 15% 5% 11% 39%
LR 24% 2% 2% 23% 28% 0% 1% 28%
1955-1982
SR 0% 9% 8% 32% 0% 2% 1% 28%
BC 1% 8% 8% 40% 1% 21% 10% 40%
LR 0% 9% 11% 27% 1% 8% 14% 33%
1983-2004
SR 10% 5% 6% 32% 7% 3% 2% 25%
BC 0% 4% 4% 41% 0% 8% 5% 35%
LR 12% 5% 4% 27% 7% 13% 39% 39%
1919-2004
SR 1% 15% 19% 34% 1% 20% 6% 33%
BC 7% 10% 13% 43% 7% 14% 4% 38%
LR 0% 3% 3% 23% 0% 8% 1% 29%
Table 7: Decomposition of Variance of Ination by Frequency, 1919-2004
cally illustrated using the regression estimation methodology of Benk et al..
(2005). Figure 7 shows that the productivity shock caused the depression era
drop in output, as expected, and that the money shock also contributed to
the depressionary output drop. But even more prolonged was the negative
e¤ect of the money shock on GDP during the Great Ination period of the
1970s, during which time the productivity shock had only positive e¤ects.
The credit shock helped GDP to increase during the 1933 banking reorga-
nization and the start of federal deposit insurance; and there is a positive
CR e¤ect on GDP during the nancial deregulation in the early 1980s. The
money shock e¤ect on ination is in evidence during the 1930s deation, and
the 1970s and 1980s ination. The credit shock lowered ination during the
depression and the late 1970s and early 1980s.
6 Discussion
A comparison of the models results can be made to the empirical literature
on the Great Moderation, such as the succinct summary and extension by
Giannone, Lenza, and Reichlin (2008). They nd that the larger the VAR
model, the more of the Great Moderation that is explained by a change in
the structure of the shock process ("good policy"), and the less by a change
in the variation of the shock process ("good luck"). Giannone et al. also
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Figure 7: E¤ect of shocks on GDP and Ination
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Correlation
PR M CR
1919-1935
PR 0.074 1.00 0.50 -0.72
M 0.020 0.50 1.00 0.18
CR 0.053 -0.72 0.18 1.00
1936-1954
PR 0.053 1.00 -0.54 -0.82
M 0.026 -0.54 1.00 0.92
CR 0.085 -0.82 0.92 1.00
1955-1982
PR 0.007 1.00 0.00 -0.23
M 0.013 0.00 1.00 0.97
CR 0.021 -0.23 0.97 1.00
1983-2004
PR 0.011 1.00 0.54 0.30
M 0.021 0.54 1.00 0.96
CR 0.040 0.30 0.96 1.00
1919-2004
PR 0.043 1.00 0.17 -0.51
M 0.023 0.17 1.00 0.75
CR 0.053 -0.51 0.75 1.00
StdDev
Table 8: Correlation Matrix of Shocks Across Subperiods, and Whole Period
emphasize that missing information biases estimates of the shock variance,
an omitted variable bias. They suggest that covariance between GDP and
other variables like ination can increase predictability, and that estimates
of the shocks must take into account such multivariate information.
Our equilibrium involves a large number of equations, and the shocks
of our model are derived from these equilibrium conditions and time series
variables. The covariance is estimated from the shocks, while taking into
account the way in which, for example, money supply growth a¤ects output
by causing ination to rise and output growth to decrease. Table 8 presents
the covariance structure of the shocks across the di¤erent subperiods and for
the whole period.
The covariance matrices across subperiod give several results:
1. Standard Deviation (SD): The SD of the goods productivity shock
(z) is much greater in the rst than the second volatility cycle, as expected
(a change in "luck"). The SD of the money shock (u) is historically similar
across subperiods, except that it is lower during the Great Ination subpe-
riod. This suggests the contribution of the monetary shocks was more in
terms of "policy"; or looking at the Great Moderation compared to the pre-
vious subperiod, the "luck" was even a bit worse. The SD of the credit shock
(v) is less stable but again lowest during the Great Ination subperiod.
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2. Covariances: The credit shock is negatively correlated with the goods
productivity shock in the rst three subperiods, but positively correlated in
the Great Moderation. And it is highly correlated with the money shock in
the last three subperiods, but negatively correlated in the Great Depression
subperiod.
One interpretation is that in the Great Depression, credit was constrained
by the collapse of the banking sector, leading to the negative correlation of
credit shocks with goods productivity shocks. Restrictions on credit may
have similarly produced a like negative correlation between CR and PR in
the next two subperiods. In the Great Moderation subperiod, credit was
liberalized with nancial deregulation, leading to a positive correlation of
CR with PR. This credit deregulation would have allowed the economy to be
more insulated from the ination tax, which in turn allowed credit to take
up an historically di¤erent, positive, role of helping output growth in part
by insulating the economy from money shocks.
Figure 8 presents the volatility of the constructed credit shock in com-
parison to that of GDP. The volatilities moved together everywhere except
especially in 1927-1938 and 1983-2004 (as well as in WWII). When credit
was repressed by banking failure in the Great Depression, GDP volatility
went way up while credit shock volatility did not rise as much. And when
deregulation began in 1981, credit volatility rose while GDP volatility fell.
This suggests that the high velocity volatility and M1 money volatility after
1983 (Figure 4), along with the high credit volatility in Figure 8, reect the
nancial deregulation e¤ect and explain how velocity and M1 volatility could
rise even while ination volatility fell.
These money and credit shocks are almost like the structural shocks
that Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2008) dene as being invariant to policy
changes, being interpretable in a plausible fashion and even in terms of good
shocks versus bad shock with the possibility of trying to o¤set the bad shocks.
They write that a consensus on the need for such structural shocks within
the dynamic macro models is emerging, with the focus on a goods productiv-
ity, or "e¢ ciency" shock, and a labor wedge shock. Our shocks include this
same goods productivity shock, and the monetary and credit shocks both af-
fect primarily the goods to leisure, or "labor", margin (through the shadow
exchange cost of goods ~R in equation 23).
Our shocks do reect policy however, as the money shock is based on
government action, either directly through the money supply, or perhaps it
26
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
19
19
19
23
19
27
19
31
19
35
19
39
19
43
19
47
19
51
19
55
19
59
19
63
19
67
19
71
19
75
19
79
19
83
19
87
19
91
19
95
19
99
20
03
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
Volatility(GDP) Volatility(Credit) (right scale)
Figure 8: Volatilities of GDP and the Credit Shock, 1919-2004
can be viewed as indirectly through ination tax nance of decits (especially
during wartime). And credit shocks are linked potentially to changes in
banking laws. This interpretation, seen also in Benk et al. 2005, is related to
that of Jermann and Quadrini (2006) and is not inconsistent with Perri and
Quadrinis (2008) nding that nancial integration decreases business cycle
volatility. In terms of good and bad shocks: the good shocks to credit are
those enhancing credit productivity, as during nancial deregulation, and the
bad shocks are those restricting credit, such as the bank collapses of the Great
Depression. These bad shocks can be o¤set or minimized, such as through
e¢ cient forms of banking insurance, and the good ones can be enhanced such
as through liberalization of markets combined with good regulation aimed
towards full information revelation including proper accounting. The money
shocks, on the other hand, contribute directly to ination volatility which is
linked closely to GDP volatility, thereby suggesting one possible conclusion
that their volatility should be minimized.
7 Conclusion
The endogenous growth model explains 49% of the volatility of GDP, and 50%
of the volatility of ination, during the Great Moderation period, through
a combination of money supply, credit productivity and goods productiv-
ity shocks. And with these shocks, the paper explains a particular puzzle
through the role of the credit shock: the divergence of higher velocity and
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money aggregate volatilities post 1983 from lower GDP and ination volatil-
ities post 1983. The models constructed credit shock also rises in volatility
during the Great Moderation subperiod, while being relatively low during
the Great Depression subperiod. We interpret the post 1983 increased credit
volatility as reecting the unleashing of credit through long run nancial
innovation during deregulation that created an ination escape valve. This
allowed monetary aggregate volatility to be manifested through higher credit
volatility rather than turning into higher ination and GDP volatility as in
previous time, in particular during the Great Depression period. Credit lib-
eralization appears to have diminished some of the ination tax uctuations
that high money supply volatility can otherwise entail. With GDP volatil-
ity coinciding with the ination volatility rather than the credit volatility,
this helped lead to the lower GDP and ination volatilities during the Great
Moderation. Then, looking forward, this model predicts both greater ina-
tion and output volatility at times when credit is constrained and the money
supply is shocked upwards, such as during the recent credit crisis, with a
subsequently greater ination and output volatility.
One extension of the model that we are studying is to include invest-
ment in the exchange constraint, as in Stockman (1981), as this makes the
ination tax fall on a fraction of investment as well as consumption, which
may be more realistic. This creates a negative e¤ect of ination on invest-
ment even while leaving the Tobin e¤ect operative as manifested through
an ination-induced rise in the capital to e¤ective labor across sectors. An-
other extension is to include the intermediation of intertemporal savings and
investment through the banking system. Credit productivity shocks could
then a¤ect the share of loans going through to the goods producer. This
might lead to a greater use of government bonds and a lessor supply of sav-
ings during the crisis, as may be consistent with evidence. And it could be
a micro-founded banking component that is useful in extending the RBC
model to explain banking crises, although perhaps a credit constraint as in
Kocherlakota (2000) in addition may be necessary.
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A Appendix.
A.1 Data Sources
Data used in the paper has been constructed on annual frequency, for the
1919 - 2004 time period. The main data sources were the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) and the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS). Series
have been extended backwards until 1919 based on the series published in
Kuznets (1941), Friedman and Schwartz (1963) (F&S) and the online NBER
Macrohistory Database (http://www.nber.org/databases/macrohistory/contents/)
(NBER). 5
The data series are as follows:
Gross Domestic Product (BEA, Kuznets).
Consumer Price Index (BEA, F&S).
Price Index for Gross Domestic Product (BEA, Kuznets).
Personal Consumption expenditures (BEA, Kuznets).
Gross private domestic investment (BEA, Kuznets).
Wage and salary accruals (BEA, Kuznets).
Wage and salary accruals, Finance, insurance, and real estate (BEA,
Kuznets).
Full-time equivalent employees (BEA, Kuznets).
Full-time equivalent employees, Finance, insurance, and real estate (BEA,
Kuznets).
M0 (IFS, NBER).
M1 (IFS, NBER).
M2 (IFS, NBER).
Treasury Bill rate (IFS, NBER).
A.2 Variance Decomposition
The decomposition of the variance of the GDP growth and velocity by shocks
is based on the principle described in Ingram, Kocherlakota, and Savin
(1994), and has been done as follows: Let z, v and u be the three, possibly
5Note that Romers revised historical data for GDP was alternatively used. Miron
and Romer (1990) reports Industrial Production rather than GDP, for the period up to
1939. This was chained to the GDP data for 1940 and after. Use of this alternative
GDP series results in more volatility in the level and in the growth rate.of output. But
the spectral decomposition results on volatility were not qualitatively a¤ected. Therefore
these alternative results are not reported.
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correlated shocks. Lets assume the ordering z-v-u, that is, the movements in
z are responsible for any comovements between z and v or z and u, and that
movements in v are responsible for any comovements between v and u. We
can formalize this notion by dening vet to be the residuals in a regression
of vt on the vector (zt; :::; zt s) and uet to be the residuals in a regression
of ut on the vector (zt; :::; zt s; vt; :::; vt s). Thus we interpret vet as captur-
ing the movements of v that are not associated with current, future, or past
movements in z.
Given this particular ordering, consider the decomposition of the variance
of GDP growth ( _4yt) into the components due to the various shocks that is
obtained by running the regression:
_4yt =
SX
s=0
z;szt s| {z }
_4yzt
+
SX
s=0
v;sv
e
t s| {z }
_4yvt
+
SX
s=0
u;su
e
t s| {z }
_4yut
+ "t (28)
Then the fraction of the variance of _4yt explained by each shock is given
by: P z = V ar(
_4yzt )
V ar( _4yt) , P
v =
V ar( _4yvt )
V ar( _4yt) , P
u =
V ar( _4yut )
V ar( _4yt) . A similar regression to
that of (28) is run on velocity and the same shocks to determine its variance
decomposition.
Unless the shocks z, v and u are orthogonal to each other, the results are
sensitive to the ordering adopted. We considered all six possible orderings
of the shocks. Results presented are the average for the two cases when the
goods productivity shock is ordered rst.
The proportion of variance of a series due to SR, BC and LR components
can be obtained as in Levy and Dezhbakhsh (2003): it amounts to estimating
the spectral density of the series, normalizing it by the series variance, and
then computing its integral over the corresponding frequency band. If we
denote by f(!) the spectral density of the series and by 2 its variance,
then the fraction of variance due to each frequency component is given by
HSR =
R 2=2
2=3
f(!)=2d!, HBC =
R 2=3
2=8
f(!)=2d!, HLR =
R 2=8
2=1 f(!)=
2d!.
The frequency bands are determined by the mapping ! = 2=p, where p
measures the cycle length (2, 3 or 8 years).
We are using an alternative, equivalent measure for the fractions of vari-
ance (suggested also by Levy and Dezhbakhsh (2003)): this consists of pass-
ing the series through a band-pass lter, estimating the variance of the ltered
series and relating it to the variance of the original series. We employ the
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Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) asymmetric band-pass lter with the afore-
mentioned 2  3, 3  8 and > 8 year bands. This procedure is applied to the
simulated series of output growth and velocity, where simulations have been
run by feeding back the estimated variance-covariance structure of the shocks
into the model. The variance-covariance matrices have been estimated sepa-
rately for each of the subperiods, this way we obtained simulated series and
decompositions that di¤er by subperiods.
To assess the fraction of variance explained by each shock in turn at
each frequency, we decompose each of the frequency component further, by
shocks. The variance decomposition procedure is similar to that described
in equation (28). The di¤erence consists in pre-ltering the target series and
the shock series to extract the adequate frequency component. According to
this, the Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) asymmetric band-pass lter with
the 2-3, 3-8 and >8 year bands is applied to the output growth and velocity
series, as well as to the productivity, money and credit shock series.
A.3 Construction of Shocks
Assume that  denotes the steady state value of variable ; and ^ denotes
its percentage deviation from the steady state (^ = log()   log()). With
~k  k=h; and any variable with a tilde above indicated the ratio of that
variable to h; and using the solution of the model from section 2, the log-
deviations of the model variables can be written as linear functions of the
state s = (b~k; z; u; v). By stacking the equations, the solution can be written
in matrix form as follows:
Xt = A
h b~kt i+B h zt ut vt i0 ; (29)
where X =
h b~c x^ l^ n^ f^ s^G a^ ^ i0 ; and ~c  c=h. From (29), one
can construct the solution of any variable of the model, by forming the
appropriate linear combination of the appropriate rows of (29), the linear
combinations being given by the linearized versions of equations (3)-(8).
Given the model solution (29) (that is, knowing the value of matrices A
and B), the series of shocks
h
zt ut vt
i
can be constructed by using data on
Xt and
b~kt and "solving" the system of linear equations (29). It can be easily
seen, that in order to identify the three series of shocks, we need data on at
least three variables from Xt. In a three-variable case the shocks represents
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the solution of a system of three linear equation. If more that three variables
are used, then the shocks are "overidentied" as we have more equations than
unknowns. In such a case we apply a least-square procedure as we illustrate
below.
In the procedure of constructing the shocks, we employ the variables on
which we were able to nd reliable data. We construct stationary variables
c=y, i=y,  and m=y, and on which we use data to construct the shocks. We
also use data on labor hour in banking sector f . and on the wage rate in
banking - the latter series being used as a proxy for the marginal product
of labor in banking (mplb). The data series on b~k is constructed by using for
k the capital accumulation equation (5), data on investment to compute b~{t
and the initial condition b~k 1 = 0. For human capital, because of a lack of a
series going back to 1919, we use a smooth trend, as data in Jorgenson and
Stiroh (2000) for 1959-1998 indicates.
Having the data series on b~k, cc=y, b, ci=y, dm=y, f^ and dmplb, we set up a
system of linear equations:
XXt = AA
h b~kt i+BB h zt ut vt i0 ; (30)
where XX =
h cc=y ci=y b dm=y bf dmplb i0 and the rows of the matrices
AA and BB result from the linear combinations of the corresponding rows
of matrices A and B, the appropriate linear combinations being given by
the linear equations that dene the variables from XX as functions of the
variables from X. The marginal product of labor in banking, is derived from
equation (11), while the denition of the other terms of the matrix XX is
straightforward.
The least square "estimates" for the shock series are computed as follows:
est
h
zt ut vt
i0
t
= (BB0BB) 1BB0(XXt   AA
h b~kt i):
In this approach we used six variables to construct the economys three
shocks. To test for the robustness of the process of shock construction, we
repeated the computation by using combinations of six variables taken ve
at a time, six taken ve at a time and six taken four at a time, allowing for
twenty-one more possible ways to construct the shocks. The results show
that all combinations that include , m=y, either c=y or i=y, and either f or
mplb generate nearly the same shock series, while other combinations show
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randomness and lack of conformity. Thus, we found that the results are
robust as long as the variables are included that correspond to the models
three sectors in which the three shocks occur.
A.4 Shock Proles
The next three gures show each of the computed shocks. Figure 9 shows
the money shock, with a rise in the money supply during the 1920s, up until
1931 and then a large drop until 1939. After a WWII bounce, it then rises
up with a long surge in the 1960s and 1970s, after which if falls again. There
are some di¤erences between the exogenous and endogenous growth models,
such as during WWII, and in the late 1990s.
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Figure 9: Money Shocks, Endogenous and Exogenous Growth Models, 1919-
2004
Figure 10 shows a strong negative e¤ect of the goods sector productivity
shock during the Great Depression, consistent with total factor productivity
stories of the Great Depression (Kehoe and Prescott 2002). The shock is
little changed from the exogenous growth version of the model.
Figure 11 shows the credit shock. During the Depression, the baseline
endogenous growth shows a positive e¤ect of the credit shock in the early part
until 1932, when banking could partially provide a means of exchange instead
of money; this was reversed then by the subsequent banking collapse. And
some positive e¤ects are apparent during the 1970s and 1980s, when interest
ceilings were controverted by new non-bank banks and when deregulation
began.
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Figure 10: Productivity Shocks, Endogenous and Exogenous Growth Models,
1919-2004
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Figure 11: Credit Shocks, Endogenous and Exogenous Growth Models, 1919-
2004
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Figure 12: Impulse responses to the technological shock - Part 1
A.5 Impulse Responses
The impulse responses show how the shocks a¤ect the economy in the short
run, in that the shocks eventually die out. Here we report the simulated
impulse responses of the baseline models variables to the three shocks on
goods sector productivity (TS), the money supply growth rate (MS) and the
credit sector productivity (CS), with two panels for each of the three shocks.
The rst set of goods productivity impulses show that the output growth
rate (gy), the real interest rate (r), the real wage (w), normalized consumption
(c/h) and money demand (m/h), the money to consumption ratio (a) and
the capital to e¤ective labor in the goods sector (s) all initially rise, while
bank labor (f) falls, and the physical capital to human capital ratio (k/h)
gradually rises after the rst period.
The second set shows that normalized output and investment, labor in
goods production, the income velocity of money (vel) and leisure all rise
initially, while the growth of human capital (gh) the labor in human capital
production, ination and the nominal interest rate all fall initially.
Money shocks cause an initial drop in the capital to human capital ratio,
normalized consumption and money demand, the real interest rate, the out-
put growth rate, the capital to e¤ective labor ratio in goods production, and
the money to consumption ratio, while causing an increase in the real wage
and labor time spent in the bank sector.
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Figure 13: Impulse responses to the technological shock - Part 2
The decrease in the real interest rate is like a liquidity e¤ect, even while
the nominal interest rate rises because of expected ination. But rather
than the real interest rate decrease being due to more capital entering the
capital markets, as with a liquidity e¤ect of a money supply increase, here
the dynamics are that the physical capital investment decreases and output
growth decreases, even as the growth rate of human capital increases.
It also causes a fall in normalized output, labor in goods production,
and normalized investment (i/h), while raising the growth rate of human
capital, the income velocity of money, leisure, the nominal interest rate and
the ination rate, and time in human capital investment.
A credit shock causes almost the exact opposite to a money shock.
In sum, the goods sector and bank sector productivity shocks increase
output growth and decrease ination, while the money shock has the opposite
e¤ect on these variables.
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Figure 14: Impulse responses to the monetary growth shock - Part 1
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Figure 15: Impulse responses to the monetary growth shock - Part 2
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Figure 16: Impulse responses to the credit sector productivity shock - Part 1
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Figure 17: Impulse responses to the credit sector productivity shock - Part 2
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